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ABSTRACT 
Recent discussions in decision sciences and behavioral economics stress the potential 
impact of affect on decision outcomes. In the present study, we conducted random-assignment 
experiments (N = 253) to investigate whether affect can cause temporary fluctuations in risk 
preferences. In particular, we employed film clips to vary the valence (positive / negative) and 
arousal level (low / high) of the affective states of student participants; following this, we 
elicited and observed risk preferences by asking the participants to make choices among 
different lotteries. The financial consequences of the lottery choices varied randomly among 
the fixed-, low-, and high-stakes treatment groups. Our results suggest that the impact of 
affect on risk preferences depends on the magnitude of the financial stakes. Specifically, we 
find that sadness induces risk aversion but only if the financial stakes are fixed or low. We 
find no evidence that affect influences risk preferences under high-stakes treatments. The 
observed sensitivity to variations in the financial incentives in our study reinforces the value 
of incentive-compatible study designs. 
Keywords: risk preferences; affect; mood; emotion; financial stakes; random-assignment 
experiment 
JEL Codes: D03, D81 
1. Introduction 
The behavior of people in situations involving risk appears to be systematically 
influenced by factors that are not directly related to the expected payoffs. For instance, recent 
studies demonstrate that natural disasters (Cameron and Shah, 2012; Eckel et al., 2009), 
terrorist attacks (Viscusi, 2009), violent trauma (Callen et al., 2011; Voors et al., 2012), 
deadly disease (Sunstein, 2003), financial crises (Guiso et al., 2013), and asset-pricing 
bubbles (Odeon et al., 2012) can change individuals’ risk preferences. However, even daily 
events, such as rainy or sunny weather (De Silva et al., 2012; Hirshleifer and Shumway, 2003; 
Kamstra et al., 2000, 2003; Kliger and Levy, 2003; Levy and Galili, 2008; Saunders, 1993), 
appear to affect the decision-making processes of individuals in situations that involve risk. 
These findings challenge the assumptions that individual risk preferences are stable over time 
and across events with similar prospective outcomes (Stiglitz and Becker, 1977). One possible 
explanation for these findings that has been suggested in the literature is that affective 
responses in individuals exert a temporary influence on their risk preferences. In an 
experiment with financial professionals, for example, Cohn et al. (2012) show that financial 
busts trigger negative emotions that diminish risk-taking behavior. 
The hypothesis that affect impacts risk preferences has its roots in psychology, which 
has a long tradition of studying the influence of affect on decision making in situations that 
involve risk. Most of the studies in this field either experimentally induce general affective 
states or measure naturally occurring moods and emotions with self-reporting scales. 
However, many of these studies have reached conflicting conclusions (e.g., Cheung and 
Mikels, 2011; Demaree et al., 2011; Heilman et al., 2010; Hockey et al., 2000; Isen and Geva, 
1987; Isen and Patrick, 1983; Lee and Andrade, 2011; Leith and Baumeister, 1996; Lerner 
and Keltner, 2001; Raghunathan and Pham, 1999; Wang, 2006; Yuen and Lee, 2003). Two 
opposing theories have emerged to explain the relationship between affect and risk 
preferences: the mood-maintenance hypothesis (MMH; Isen and Patrick, 1983) and the affect-
infusion model (AIM; Forgas, 1995). The MMH suggests that a positive affect leads to risk-
averse behavior and that a negative affect produces risk-seeking behavior (e.g., Hockey et al., 
2000; Kim and Kanfer, 2009; Kliger and Levy, 2003; Wegener and Petty, 1994), whereas the 
AIM proposes that affect will influence risk preferences in exactly the opposite manner (e.g., 
Au et al., 2003; Finucane et al., 2000; Grable and Roszkowski, 2008; Hirshleifer and 
Shumway, 2003; Johnson and Tversky, 1983; Kamstra et al., 2003; Leith and Baumeister, 
1996; Levy and Galili, 2008; Yuen and Lee, 2003). 
There are several possible causes for the inconsistent results in the literature with 
respect to the influence of affect on risk preferences. First, most of the studies that have 
addressed this topic have only examined generally positive and negative affects and have 
therefore neglected the different impact that may be produced by distinct affective states of 
the same valence. In particular, different shades of negative affects (e.g., anger, fear, sadness) 
might have a greater variety of impact than positive affects (e.g., joy, excitement, trust). 
Furthermore, negative affects may not necessarily have the opposite impact of positive affects 
(Isen, 2000). To gain more insight into the specific influences that affective states of the same 
valence may have on decisions that involve risk, certain studies have examined different 
arousal levels of affective states (Leith and Baumeister, 1996; Lerner and Keltner, 2001). 
Whereas the valence dimension of affect describes the extent to which affective states involve 
pleasant or unpleasant experiences, the arousal dimension expresses the level of activation 
associated with the affective experience (Russell, 1980). Following the arousal description, 
joy is regarded to have a positive valence and can be either low arousal (relaxed) or high 
arousal (happy). Sadness, fear, and anger each has a negative valence, but sadness is 
described as a low arousal state whereas fear and anger are high arousal states (Russell, 1980; 
Watson and Tellegen, 1985). A few studies (Carver and Harmon-Jones, 2009; Lerner and 
Keltner, 2001) have argued that fear and anger could have opposite effects on risk perception, 
although both are affective states with a negative valence. Fear may cause pessimistic risk 
assessments and risk aversion; by contrast, angry individuals may evaluate risk more 
optimistically and therefore become more risk seeking. Furthermore, happy individuals may 
also express optimistic risk estimates and therefore may appear to resemble angry individuals 
with respect to their risk behavior (Lerner and Keltner, 2001). Investigating the influence of 
distinct affective states with different valence and arousal levels on risk preferences may help 
explain the inconsistencies in the findings of prior studies. 
Second, the inconsistent empirical results associated with the opposing predictions of 
the AIM and the MMH may be caused by publication bias, i.e., the tendency of researchers 
and journals to report findings rather than non-findings (for a discussion of the problem of 
publication bias, please see Ashenfelter et al., 1999; Dickersen and Min, 1993; Ioannides, 
2005). 
A third possible reason for the inconsistent results is that the participants in most studies 
in the field of psychology make hypothetical decisions without personal consequences.1
A number of recent economic studies have adopted a different methodological paradigm 
and investigated the role of affective states in decision making that considers risk by assessing 
observed financial investments in the field, i.e., by examining revealed preferences rather than 
hypothetical decisions (Hirshleifer and Shumway, 2003; Kamstra et al., 2000, 2003; Kliger 
and Levy, 2003; Levy and Galili, 2008; Saunders, 1993; Shu, 2010). Whereas most of these 
economic studies used naturally occurring mood proxies, such as the weather (De Silva et al., 
2012; Hirshleifer and Shumway, 2003; Kliger and Levy, 2003; Levy and Galili, 2008; 
Saunders, 1993), biorhythms (Kamstra et al., 2000; Yuan et al., 2006), or seasonal affective 
disorder (Kamstra et al., 2003), other studies are based on survey measures of naturally 
occurring moods (Fehr-Duda et al., 2008) or on experimentally induced moods (Capra et al., 
2004; Kirchsteiger et al., 2006). 
 
Economists have raised questions about the internal and external validity of such studies 
(Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Smith, 1982). If the results of decisions do not produce personal 
consequences, then decision makers will be less inclined to carefully consider their responses, 
and they may be more likely to attempt to please the experimenter with an anticipated 
response instead of seeking to maximize their own utility. In addition, other potential sources 
of utility that are irrelevant outside the laboratory context may influence the decisions that are 
observed. Furthermore, fixed participation fees instead of incentive-compatible designs may 
offset randomization across treatments and lead to biased samples (Harrison et al., 2009). To 
address these concerns, Smith (1982) suggested that experimental studies of decision making 
should fulfill the salience and dominance criteria. The salience criterion requires clearly 
understood rewards to be linked to an individual’s behavior. The dominance criterion 
stipulates that monetary rewards or costs dominate all other potential sources of utility. 
                                                 
1 One noteworthy exception is the study by Lee and Andrade (2011), which examines the influence of fear in 
stock market simulations. 
However, because these studies investigate generally positive or negative affects, the 
interpretations of their results remain vague with respect to which specific affective states are 
involved in the impact that is observed. For instance, it is unclear how weather will affect 
people’s mood because rain might produce sadness in certain individuals and anger in others. 
Thus, for different individuals, the same external events can trigger various affective states of 
the same valence with different arousal levels. The differences in these negative affective 
states cannot be identified in laboratory experiments when inducing or measuring generally 
negative affects. An incentive-compatible laboratory experiment that induces and measures 
specific affective states that vary in valence and arousal levels may address these issues and 
examine whether distinct moods have a causal influence on risk preferences. 
Our study reports the results from this type of experiment. Specifically, we investigate 
the influence of three distinct affective states (joy, fear, and sadness) on risk preferences in the 
gain domain in laboratory random-assignment experiments involving nonexistent, low, or 
high financial stakes. We chose to induce joy, fear, and sadness because of their different 
valence and arousal dimensions (Russell, 1980; Watson and Tellegen, 1985); moreover, these 
affective states are likely to be present among economic agents in a wide range of situations 
(Scherer, 2005) and can be triggered by everyday circumstances in most cultures (Ekman, 
1992). We measured the specific affective states of participants before and after mood 
induction using subscales of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS-X; Watson 
and Clark, 1994), which is the most commonly used psychometric measurement of affect in 
the psychological literature (e.g., Harmon-Jones, 2003; Lee and Allen, 2002; Stanton et al., 
2000). 
Moods are generally described as low-intensity, diffuse, and relatively enduring 
affective states that often arise for no particularly salient reason. By contrast, compared with 
moods, emotions are considered to be more intense and short-lived affective states that 
generally have a definite cause and clear cognitive content. Affect is often used as an 
umbrella term that refers to the current moods and emotions of individuals (Davidson, 1994; 
Gray and Watson, 2001). It is important to note that the distinctions between moods and 
emotions are largely theoretical rather than empirical in nature. In research practice, identical 
methods are often used to induce both moods and emotions (Fredrickson, 2002). In this paper, 
we use the term mood because we believe that the definition of mood—low-intensity, diffuse, 
and not object-directed—better fits our induction procedure with film clips than the definition 
of emotion, which is intense, object-directed, and with clear cognitive content. 
Following Holt and Laury (2002), we use lottery-choice menus in our study to elicit risk 
preferences. This is an established and frequently used approach (e.g., Blavatskyy, 2009; 
Colombier et al., 2008; Goeree et al., 2003; Johansson-Stenman, 2010). Furthermore, we 
differentiate between nonexistent, low, and high financial stakes in a random-assignment 
experimental design. This variance in the financial stakes is an important design element of 
our study for three reasons. First, risk preferences appear to be sensitive to the magnitude of 
the financial stakes that are involved in a decision (Camerer and Hogarth, 1999; Croson and 
Gneezy, 2009; Holt and Laury, 2002). Thus, it is not immediately obvious that the results 
from an experiment on risk preferences that involves small or nonexistent financial stakes 
would be replicable with high stakes or in the field. Second, in a study of the impact of a 
positive affect on risk preferences, Isen and Patrick (1983) found that subjects who were faced 
with hypothetical decisions demonstrated behavior that was diametrically opposed to that of 
individuals who (erroneously) believed that their decisions would affect their course grades. 
Thus, we vary the financial stakes in our random-assignment experiments to investigate if and 
how the financial stakes moderate the impact of moods on risk preferences. Third, varying 
both the financial stakes and differentiating between specific moods that differ in valence and 
arousal allows us to parse between two of the possible reasons for the inconsistent empirical 
results in the literature. 
2. Data 
2.1 Participants 
We conducted two studies in a large German university’s laboratory for economic 
experiments. Study 1 included three decision tasks, and one of these tasks was the current 
study on risk preferences. The other two tasks were incentive-compatible measures of 
ambiguity preferences and overconfidence, the results of which are unpublished. The 
sequence of the three tasks was randomized to prevent fixed-choice ordering. In study 1, we 
recruited a total of 322 participants: 142 participants had no financial stakes, 144 participants 
had low financial stakes, and 36 participants had high financial stakes. However, we only use 
data from the participants who completed the risk preference task directly after the mood 
induction (108 participants in total, including 48 participants with no financial stakes, 48 
participants with low financial stakes, and 12 participants with high financial stakes) because 
these data are most comparable with the data from study 2. We used the 214 observations on 
risk preferences from study 1 that could not be pooled with the data from study 2 for further 
robustness checks, as we discuss below. 
Study 2 was identical to study 1 in terms of experimental procedures, except for two 
differences. First, study 2 included no other tasks than the measurement of risk preferences 
after mood induction. Second, we asked participants about their risk preferences in the loss 
domain before we asked them about their risk preferences in the gain domain in study 2. 
Because of the rules of the laboratory in which the experiment was conducted, we did not 
require participants to pay us in cases involving loss. Thus, there was no incentive-compatible 
measure of risk preferences in the loss domain, and we therefore only include risk preferences 
from the gain domain in the current article. We conducted a generalized Chow test to confirm 
that our main results are not driven by a potential confound (please see section 3.3 for 
methods and results). In study 2, 37 participants had no financial stakes, 41 participants had 
low financial stakes, and 67 participants had high financial stakes. Our main analyses below 
are based on the pooled sample from study 1 and 2 (total N = 253), which included 85 
participants with no financial stakes, 89 participants with low financial stakes, and 79 
participants with high financial stakes. 
The experiment was programmed in z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and we recruited 
participants using the Internet-based ORSEE system (Greiner, 2004), which allowed us to 
ensure that there was no overlap between the participants in studies 1 and 2. In each 
experimental session, all three of the mood treatments (i.e., the induction of a joyful, fearful, 
or sad mood) and a control treatment (i.e., no mood induction) were conducted on personal 
computers that were randomly matched with the participants. All of the computers looked 
identical, and only the experimenters knew the participants’ treatment groups. During the 
entire experiment, study participants could not communicate with one another. Participants 
wore headphones and each participant’s working station was concealed from the view of other 
participants by walls. The participants had no time restrictions for completing the experiment. 
On average, participants completed study 1 in 30 minutes and study 2 in 20 minutes. 
The pooled sample of studies 1 and 2 consisted of 104 males and 149 females with an 
average age of 24 (SD = 3.41). The youngest and oldest participants were 18 and 43 years old, 
respectively. In total, 243 of the participants were students, and 10 of the participants were 
non-students. Of the 243 students, 2% were majoring in the fine arts, 18% in the humanities, 
32% in the social sciences, 4% in the biological sciences, and 19% in the physical sciences. 
The remaining 25% were studying other subjects. 
2.2 Procedures 
The pooled observations from studies 1 and 2 followed identical experimental 
procedures in the following aspects. Upon their arrival, the participants were introduced to the 
session and signed consent forms confirming that they had read and understood the terms and 
conditions of the experiment and that the experimenters had adequately answered all of their 
questions. 
On the first screen of the experiment, the participants were informed that they were 
about to participate in an experiment on economic decision making that included real 
financial payoffs. The participants were then asked to complete questions about their socio-
economic status, which included their age, gender, current occupation, level of education, 
academic major, personality traits (Gosling et al., 2003)2
Subsequently, the participants in the three treatment groups watched a film clip that was 
intended to manipulate their mood (please see section 2.3). After watching this film clip, these 
participants again indicated their mood states (please see section 2.4.1). The participants in 
the control group did not watch a film clip (Verheyen and Göritz, 2009) and instead 
completed the mood scales only once at the beginning of the experiment with the same mood 
measurement instrument. All the participants then received separate instructions with respect 
to the magnitude of the financial stakes (please see Appendix A for detailed experimental 
instructions for both experimental sets) but solved the same risk-preference task (please see 
Appendix B for the lottery-choice task). Table 1 indicates the number of subjects across the 
treatment groups who had fixed, low, and high financial stakes. 
, and individual risk attitude 
(Dohmen et al., 2011). After completing these measures, participants were asked to complete 
self-reported assessments of their pre-induction mood (please see section 2.4.1). 
                                                 
2 Overall, internal reliabilities for extraversion (Cronbach’s α = 0.74), agreeableness (α = 0.23), 
conscientiousness (α = 0.71), emotional stability (α = 0.69), and openness (α = 0.52) were not satisfactory. 
Therefore, we conducted a rotated factor analysis and extracted four components with eigenvalues that were 
greater than 1, that is, extraversion, emotional stability, conscientiousness, and openness. Agreeableness was not 
found to be a separate factor and was not included as a control variable in the analysis. The principal component 
analysis (PCA) considers all the available information, whereas sum scores of the items for one personality 
dimension would ignore the personality differences among participants. The factor scores and the sum scores 
were almost perfectly correlated for all four of the five personality dimensions examined (rs > 0.90, ps < 0.001). 
Table 1 
Number of subjects with consistent risk-preference measures across financial treatment 
groups in the pooled studies 1 and 2. 
 Fixed stakes  Low stakes High stakes Total 
No mood induction 20 18 18 56  
Joy induction 18 19 17 54  
Fear induction 20 21 17 58  
Sadness induction 17 21 17 55  
 
Total 
 
75  
 
79  
 
69  
 
223  
Note: 30 of the original 253 subjects were excluded from the analyses and this table because 
they either had inconsistent risk preferences or did not understand the decision task (please 
see section 2.4.2 for further details). 
 
The instructions for the condition that involved fixed financial stakes explained that the 
individuals who were participating under this condition would receive a fixed payoff of 9 
EUR at the end of the experiment, regardless of their performance, which consisted of an 
attendance fee of 4 EUR and an additional 5 EUR to compensate them for their time. These 
participants were, however, urged to try their best to solve the subsequent tasks. The 
participants who experienced the low- and high-stakes treatments were instructed that their 
payoff at the end of the experiment would depend on their decisions in the subsequent task. 
These participants received an attendance fee of 4 EUR and the opportunity to earn an 
additional payoff of up to 15.40 EUR. The participants in the high-stakes treatment were told, 
in addition, that they had a 1:36 or 2.8% chance to centuplicate their payoff. The maximum 
amount that the high-stakes participants might win, therefore, was 1,540 EUR. Whether the 
payoff would be centuplicated depended on the outcome of a fair lottery draw that was 
explained to the participants in the high-stakes treatment. We chose 36 participants per high-
stakes sessions because of the available seats in the laboratory and because of the reasonable 
probability to win the high-stakes payoff. 
After receiving the financial instructions, all the participants completed the same risk-
preference task. The completion of this task was the last stage of the study for the participants 
in the nonexistent-stakes treatment. For the participants in the incentive-compatible 
treatments, the payoffs were randomly determined by computer in accordance with the 
experimental instructions and observed behavior. Immediately after each session had 
concluded, all the session participants were thanked and separately received their payoffs. The 
participants in the high-stakes treatment also received a card that stated the time and location 
for the drawing of a lottery number (ranging from 1 to 36) that would determine whose payoff 
was centuplicated. At the specified times, the participants of the high-stakes sessions each 
drew one number in the presence of 35 other high-stakes participants who participated in the 
same lottery draw. The participants provided their names, addresses, and telephone numbers 
and signed forms that confirmed the lottery numbers they drew. Two hours later, for each of 
the three high-stakes lotteries, we randomly drew one of the 36 numbers. The participants 
with the winning numbers received one hundred times the standard conversion rate of the 
experimental currency in Euros. The high-stakes participants had all been invited to be 
present at these drawings, but only a fraction of these participants were actually in attendance 
for each drawing. The drawings of the numbers were video recorded and subsequently 
published on a publically accessible faculty website; the names of the winners were not 
announced, however. We chose this public procedure to increase participants’ trust in our 
payoff method and simultaneously to ensure the winners’ anonymity. The three winners were 
informed immediately and confidentially, and the money that they had won was transferred to 
their bank accounts. 
The slightly different payoff mechanism in the high-stakes treatment introduces another 
layer of uncertainty and delay in payoffs into the experiment compared to the low-stakes 
treatment. We note, however, that our experimental design still allows us to compare the 
effects of moods on risk preferences within each of the three financial-stakes treatments. We 
discuss below (please see section 4) if and how the differences in payoff mechanisms might 
influence the comparability of our results between the different financial-stakes treatments. 
2.3 The mood induction process 
We used three film clips that were each 7 minutes in length and that were extracted 
from Hollywood movies to induce a joyful, fearful, or sad mood in three quarters of the 
participants. The use of film clips to manipulate moods is standard methodology for studying 
affect in experimental settings (e.g., Bradley et al., 2009; Guiso et al., 2013; Heilmann et al., 
2010; Ifcher and Zarghamee, 2011; Kirchsteiger et al., 2006; Lee and Andrade, 2011; Lerner 
et al., 2004; Odeon et al., 2012). Film clips have been shown to be one of the most effective 
mood manipulation mechanisms and have been utilized to induce either positive or negative 
affective states (Gerrards-Hesse et al., 1994; Westermann et al., 1996). In total, 193 
participants were induced with joyful (64 participants), fearful (64 participants), or sad (65 
participants) moods, using film clips from “When Harry met Sally” (1989), “Paranormal 
Activity” (2007), and “The Champ” (1979), respectively (Gross and Levenson, 1995; Hewig 
et al., 2005). 
Prior to viewing the film clips, the participants were asked to become involved in the 
feelings that were suggested in the film clips and to clear their mind of all of their thoughts, 
feelings, and memories. The mood induction effects are assumed to be more intense if explicit 
instructions are provided to study participants (Westermann et al., 1996). After the film clip 
had concluded, the participants were required to indicate whether they had previously 
watched the movie that was the source of the clip in question. At the end of the experiment, 
the participants who received the negative mood inductions were shown the film clip of the 
joyful mood treatment as a counter induction (Göritz and Moser, 2006). We also showed the 
joyful film clip to the control group participants because this activity consumed a portion of 
the time that these participants had available while they waited for the other participants to 
complete the experiment and receive their payoff. 
2.4 Measures 
2.4.1 Mood measurement 
We used three subscales of the short version of the PANAS-X (Watson and Clark, 
1994; Watson et al., 1988) to measure participants’ specific moods at the beginning of the 
experiment (once in the control group and twice in the treatment groups). The PANAS-X is 
the most researched psychometric measure of affect; in fact, the original article by Watson et 
al. (1988) has been cited more than 7,873 times as of May 2013, according to the Thomson 
Reuters Web of Knowledge. We used the joviality subscale of this metric (e.g., happy, joyful, 
or delighted; Cronbach’s αbefore induction = 0.87, αafter induction = 0.92) to assess participants’ levels 
of joy at the beginning of the experiment, the fear subscale (e.g., afraid, scared, or frightened, 
αb = 0.83, αa = 0.92) to measure participants’ levels of fear, and the sadness subscale (e.g., 
sad, blue, or downhearted, αb = 0.88, αa = 0.90) to measure participants’ levels of sadness. 
2.4.2 Risk preferences 
To measure risk preferences, we used an adaptation of the Holt and Laury (2002) 
method, which asks participants to make a series of choices between two lotteries with 
different payoffs (please see Appendix B for the lottery-choice task). The payoffs are 
structured such that one lottery (option S) is less risky than the other (option R). In addition, 
the series of payoffs is designed such that at the beginning of the experiment, the expected 
value of the safe choice (S) is higher than the expected value of the risky choice (R). During 
the course of the series of choices, the difference in expected values between the two choices 
becomes successively smaller until it reverses; thus, as the series of choices continues, the 
riskier choice (R) has an increasing advantage in the expected value that the participant will 
receive. The point at which the participants switch from the safe (S) to the risky (R) lottery 
reveals their risk preferences. Participants in the incentive-compatible treatments (the low- 
and high-financial-stakes treatments) knew that one of the decision options would be 
randomly chosen and that their decision performances would affect the quantity of real money 
that they received at the end of the experiment. 
In total, 30 participants displayed choices that were not compatible with expected utility 
theory. These participants either preferred the safe option (S) in the last lottery choice (i.e., a 
sure win of 800 Experimental Dollars [ED])—despite the fact that this choice is strictly 
dominated by the “risky” (R) option (i.e., a sure win of 1,540 ED)—or switched between the 
lotteries more than once and thereby displayed inconsistent preferences. We excluded these 
30 participants from further analyses to avoid inference problems (Andersen et al., 2006; Holt 
and Laury, 2002). In our sample, by the standard specified above, females (Chi2 = 6.26, p = 
0.01)3 were more likely than males to exhibit inconsistent or unreasonable choices. 
Furthermore, there is no indication that the excluded subjects were non-randomly distributed 
across the financial-stakes treatments (Chi2 = 0.08, p = 0.96)4 or the mood treatments (Chi2 = 
3.57, p = 0.31)5
3. Results 
. 
3.1 Mood inductions 
According to the participants’ self-evaluations, all of the mood inductions appear to 
have worked successfully.6
                                                 
3 We take a conservative approach and report two-sided p-values throughout the entire paper. 
 In particular, the participants that viewed the joyful film clip 
reported that their joy after induction was significantly higher than their joy before induction 
4 From these 30 participants, 10 participants were excluded from each financial stake condition. 
5 From these 30 participants, 10 participants were excluded from the sadness and the joy treatment, 6 from the 
fear treatment, and 4 from the control treatment. 
6 We used factor scores for the analysis because factor scores consider all the available information, whereas 
sum scores of the items for one mood type would ignore the mood differences among participants that arose 
from changes in fear or sadness. The principal component analysis (PCA) factor scores are based on PANAS-X 
items. Varimax rotation is applied. The factor scores and sum scores were almost perfectly correlated for all 
three of the examined moods (r > 0.95, p < 0.001). The results are robust to using sum scores instead of factor 
scores. 
(t[df = 63] = -6.19, p < 0.001, d7
 
 = 1.56). Similarly, with respect to the fearful film clip, 
participants showed higher fear after induction than before induction (t[df = 63] = -5,17, p < 
0.001, d = 1.30), and the sad film clip caused participants to report significantly higher 
sadness after induction than they had reported before induction (t[df = 64] = -4.91, p < 0.001, 
d = 1.23). Table 2 indicates the factor scores of the principal component analyses of the self-
reported moods across treatments after mood induction. This table illustrates that study 
participants self-report the highest mean values for a particular mood after they have been 
exposed to the appropriate mood treatment. 
Table 2 
Self-reported moods across treatments after mood induction. 
 Self-reported 
joy 
Self-reported 
fear 
Self-reported 
sadness 
 Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err. 
No mood induction 0.50 0.72 -0.30 0.46 -0.07 0.69 
Joy induction 0.72 1.04 -0.38 0.40 -0.33 0.40 
Fear induction -0.44 0.77 1.01 1.28 -0.42 0.98 
Sadness induction -0.73 0.57 -0.34 0.78 0.80 1.20 
 
We assessed whether the participants’ affective reactions to the film clips differed with 
respect to gender (Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Hagemann et al., 1999), personality traits 
(Gross et al., 1998) or prior exposure to the film (Gross and Levenson, 1995). Compared to 
men, women self-reported higher fear (t[df = 62] = -3.15, p = 0.003, d = 0.80) and sadness 
(t[df = 63] = -2.25, p = 0.03, d = 0.57) levels after induction. Previously published studies 
have shown that men intentionally report lower levels of negative moods than women (e.g., 
Blier and Blier-Wilson 1989; Sutton and Farrall 2005). In the fear treatment, participants high 
in emotional stability reported lower levels of fear after the induction (r = -0.39, p = 0.001). 
There were no significant personality effects on the strength of the mood inductions in the joy 
and in the sadness treatment (Pearson correlations, ps > 0.08). In addition, we find no 
evidence that prior exposure to the film (t-test, ps > 0.10)8 produced any influence on the 
strength of the mood inductions that were observed. Using sum scores instead of factor scores 
for the mood and personality scales yields similar results.9
3.2 Descriptions and correlations 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the proportion of safe choices in each of the 10 lottery decisions. 
The horizontal axis indicates the number of safe choices and the vertical axis indicates the 
probability of safe choices. Participants in the sad mood treatment show the highest overall 
risk aversion. Participants in the joy and the fear treatments are also marginally more risk-
averse than participants in the control group. A one-way analysis of variances (ANOVA, F[3, 
219] = 2.35, p = 0.07) with least-significant differences (LSD) post-hoc test indicates that, in 
                                                 
7 Cohen (1988) suggests that d = 0.20 denotes a small effect, d = 0.50 denotes a medium effect, and d = 0.80 
denotes a large effect. 
8 19 participants in the joy treatment and 8 participants in the fearful treatment had seen the respective movie 
before participating in the experiment. No participant had previously seen the sad movie. 
9 Detailed results available upon request. 
general, risk aversion is significantly higher in the sadness (M = 2.02, SD = 1.80) group than 
in the joy (M = 1.28, SD = 1.78, p = 0.04, d = 0.41), fear (M = 1.40, SD = 1.75, p = 0.07, d = 
0.35), and control groups (M = 1.18, SD = 1.98, p = 0.02, d = 0.44). 
 
Figure 1 
Proportion of safe choices – data averages across treatment groups (N = 223). 
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Correlation results (please see Appendix C) show that our careful randomization 
procedures were not entirely successful in distributing personal characteristics equally across 
treatment groups (ps < 0.05). Therefore, we included personality characteristics in the 
following regressions as control variables. The risk attitudes that were self-reported before the 
mood induction using the general risk question of Dohmen et al. (2011) were weakly 
correlated with the elicited risk preferences (r = 0.16, p = 0.02), and they were randomly 
distributed across the treatment groups. Gender and age are not correlated with either our 
measure of risk preference or the treatment groups; thus, these factors do not influence the 
regression results. 
3.3 Regression results 
To analyze the relationship between moods and risk preference, we consider a model of 
the form 
(1) 
Ni
CSFMSFSMFMSFMay ii
,...,1
)()()()( 87654321
=
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, 
where yi is the observed risk preference of subject i, M is a set of dummy variables for 
the mood treatment (control, joy, fear, sadness), F is a set of dummy variables for the 
financial-stakes treatment (nonexistent, low, high), and S is a dummy for studies 1 and 2. C is 
a vector of control variables for personality scores and self-reported risk preferences before 
the experimental treatments. The β coefficients are the differential intercepts for the 
experimental treatments, whereas a gives an estimate of the common intercept. 
This model arrangement that includes dummy variables for the different experimental 
treatments both in additive and in multiplicative form may be used to test the assumptions that 
moods (M) influence risk preferences independent from the magnitude of the financial stakes 
(F) and the study design (S) (Chow, 1960; Gujarati, 1970). Our main interest lies in the 
effects of M and F and their interaction, which is reported in Table 3. We control for S, MS, 
and FS as potential confounds that may otherwise arise as the result of the slightly different 
experimental conditions in studies 1 and 2. Model 1 assumes that β4 and β7 are zero, reflecting 
the implicit assumption from previous studies that the magnitude of financial stakes does not 
moderate the effect of moods on risk preferences. Model 2 relaxes this assumption and 
explicitly estimates β4. Model 3 estimates the full set of coefficients as a further robustness 
check. 
In the following regressions, a positive coefficient denotes risk-averse preferences and a 
negative coefficient indicates risk-seeking preferences. In all three Models in Table 3, we find 
no evidence that the fear treatment influences risk preferences. Sadness, by contrast, is 
significantly associated with risk aversion in Model 1 (p = 0.03). Although the main effect is 
insignificant in Models 2 and 3, the effect size is similarly strong. In Model 2, we find 
evidence that the effects of moods are dependent on the magnitude of the financial stakes that 
are involved. Specifically, the participants in the joy group are more risk seeking under the 
low-stakes treatments (β = -0.22, p = 0.09) than under conditions involving either nonexistent 
or high stakes. These findings suggest that a pooled analysis of the three financial stake 
conditions is not appropriate. Model 3 gives no indication of an influence of moods on risk 
preferences when we control for the financial-stakes treatments and all other potential 
confounds.10
                                                 
10 No evidence against poolability was produced by a poolability analysis across the factor of gender. Detailed 
results are available upon request. 
 
Table 3 
OLS regressions on risk preferences. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 β p β p β p 
Intercept 0.28 0.60 0.23 0.71 0.26 0.71 
Joy 0.09 0.41 0.14 0.42 0.18 0.39 
Fear 0.07 0.54 -0.01 0.94 -0.05 0.79 
Sadness 0.22** 0.03 0.27 0.11 0.25 0.21 
Low stakes -0.04 0.72 0.06 0.75 0.01 0.97 
High stakes -0.10 0.28 -0.15 0.37 -0.14 0.49 
Joy*Low stakes   -0.22* 0.09 -0.25 0.18 
Joy*High stakes   0.05 0.67 0.02 0.90 
Fear*Low stakes   0.02 0.89 0.12 0.53 
Fear*High stakes   0.09 0.48 0.09 0.57 
Sadness*Low stakes   -0.04 0.79 0 1.00 
Sadness*High stakes   -0.05 0.71 -0.05 0.76 
Joy*Low stakes*Study2     0.05 0.79 
Joy*High stakes*Study2     0.04 0.74 
Fear*Low stakes*Study2     -0.15 0.46 
Fear*High stakes*Study2     0.05 0.64 
Sadness*Low stakes*Study2     -0.05 0.81 
Sadness*High stakes*Study2     0.02 0.89 
Model diagnostics     
N 223 223 223 
R2 0.11 0.14 0.15 
Prob > F 0.07 0.07 0.20 
Note: βs are standardized for all variables except for the intercept. 
Control variables are the experimental study design, experimental study design*mood 
treatments, experimental study design*financial stakes, personality factor scores, and self-
reported risk attitudes. 
The reference groups are the control treatment, nonexistent financial stakes, and study 1. 
The results are robust for the exclusion of control variables, for the inclusion of additional 
control variables such as gender, age, and whether the movie was seen before, for including 
personality sum scores instead of factor scores, and for using OLogit instead of OLS. 
* denotes > 90% confidence, ** denotes > 95% confidence, and *** denotes > 99% 
confidence. 
 
Table 4 provides three separate OLS regressions for the financial stake conditions of the 
experiment. We find no significant effects of moods on risk preferences. This may be caused 
by the smaller sample sizes in each of the regressions, which reduce the statistical power to 
identify small effect sizes. Moreover, a regression analysis using the pooled sample of the 
incentive-compatible low- and high-stakes treatments (N = 148) does not indicate any 
significant effects of participants’ moods on risk preferences either (please see Table D1 in 
Appendix D). However, the interaction effect of joy and low financial stakes is again 
significant in Model 2 in Table D1. 
Table 4 
OLS regressions on risk preferences – by stakes (N = 223). 
 Model 1: 
Fixed stakes 
Model 2: 
Low stakes 
Model 3: 
High stakes 
 β p β p β p 
Intercept 0.10 0.91 0.58 0.53 -0.75 0.43 
Joy 0.25 0.22 -0.26 0.21 0.19 0.23 
Fear -0.01 0.96 0.11 0.61 0.09 0.56 
Sadness 0.27 0.18 0.20 0.33 0.19 0.28 
Model diagnostics    
N 75 79 69 
R2 0.22 0.19 0.18 
Prob > F 0.18 0.27 0.47 
Note: βs are standardized for all variables except for the intercept. 
Control variables are the experimental study design, experimental study design*mood 
treatments, personality factor scores, and self-reported risk attitudes. 
The reference group is the control treatment. 
The results are robust for the exclusion of control variables; for the inclusion of additional 
control variables, such as gender, age, and whether the movie was seen before; for including 
personality sum scores instead of factor scores; and for using OLogit instead of OLS. 
* denotes > 90% confidence, ** denotes > 95% confidence, and *** denotes > 99% 
confidence. 
 
We conducted robustness checks of our results with model specifications in Table 3 
using the excluded observations from study 1 (N = 214, please see Table D2 in Appendix D) 
and the pooled observations from study 1 (N = 322, please see Table D3 in Appendix D). 
There is no evidence that mood has a direct effect on risk preferences. However, the results in 
Tables D2 and D3 indicate that the financial-stakes treatments have significant direct and 
indirect effects on risk preferences. These findings corroborate our previous results that the 
effects of moods on risk preferences depend on the magnitude of the financial stakes. 
Furthermore, we calculated three separate OLS regressions for the financial stake 
conditions with the pooled observations from study 1 (N = 322, please see Table D4 in 
Appendix D). The results show that sadness leads to risk aversion when the financial stakes 
are low, which speaks again to a moderating effect of financial stakes between moods and risk 
preferences. We find no indications that moods influence risk preferences when the financial 
stakes are high. 
In addition, we performed statistical sensitivity analyses (Erdfelder et al., 1996) for 
Model 3 in Table 4 to estimate the maximum effect sizes that we could identify in the high-
stakes data. For the 69 participants in this Model and at a significance threshold of p = 0.1, we 
had 50% power to detect the effects of variables that explain at least 9.7% of the variance in 
risk preferences, i.e., the increase in overall R2 that is caused by the predictor. In a pooled 
model that uses all of the high-stakes data from experimental sets 1 and 2 (N = 92, please see 
Table D5 in Appendix D), we had 50% power to identify even smaller effects (R2 > 7%). 
Because we do not find coefficients with p-values that are close to 0.1 in these models in 
Tables 4 and D5, we conclude that the influence of the induced moods on risk preferences in 
our sample is likely to be small or nonexistent under conditions in which the decisions of 
participants have serious monetary consequences. 
4. Discussion 
To study the effects of moods on risk preferences, our random-assignment experiments 
used standard techniques from psychology to manipulate and measure moods and a standard 
incentive compatible technique from economics to elicit risk preferences. In addition to a 
control group that did not receive mood manipulation, we varied both the valence and the 
arousal level of the affective states of participants by inducing three distinct moods, i.e., joy 
(positive, high arousal), fear (negative, high arousal), and sadness (negative, low arousal). In 
addition, we also varied the financial-stakes treatments across participants (i.e., fixed-, low-, 
and high-stakes treatments). These two dimensions of random between-subject variation in 
our experiment allow us to parse between two possible explanations for the inconsistent 
empirical results found in the previous literature on this topic—biases that may be introduced 
by non-incentive-compatible experimental designs, and biases introduced by unobserved 
variation in the induced moods. Considered in their entirety, our results underscore the 
possible relevance of both types of biases in the literature on affect and risk preferences. 
Our result for the influence of sadness on risk preferences when the financial stakes are 
fixed or low is most comparable with earlier studies in psychology that are almost exclusively 
based on experiments employing hypothetical decisions. In particular, the result that sadness 
causes risk aversion is consistent with the predictions of the AIM (Forgas, 1995). The AIM 
relies on the valence perspective and hypothesizes that affect has a congruent effect if a 
substantive processing strategy is used for the given information. Because we assume that our 
risk preferences measure required considerable cognitive processing effort, negatively 
valenced moods such as sadness led to mood-congruent decision outcomes, i.e., risk aversion. 
However, neither the AIM nor the competing MMH (Isen and Patrick, 1983) can explain our 
null results for joy and fear. 
Instead, our result for sadness and risk aversion in the fixed- and low-stakes treatments 
may be explained by the valence-arousal framework (Russell, 1980; Watson and Tellegen, 
1985). Studies consistent with this framework suggest that affective states may not only 
influence decision making through their valence but also through their arousal level. Whereas 
low-arousal affective states (e.g., sadness) are supposed to promote structured information 
processing, high arousal affective states (e.g., fear, happy) are assumed to lead to less 
structured information processing (e.g., Sanbonmatsu and Kardes, 1998). Although certain 
recent studies have questioned the inhibiting influence of fear as a high arousal state on 
information processing and argue that fear can also promote structured and systematic 
thinking (Lerner and Keltner, 2000, 2001; Tiedens and Linton, 2001), our findings seem to 
support the common view that fear may rather resemble joy instead of sadness because fear 
and joy show no effects on risk preferences. Hence, although fear and sadness share the same 
valence level, it is reasonable to argue that joy and fear share the same arousal level and lead 
to identical non-existent effects on risk preferences. Consequently, from an arousal 
perspective, our results would imply that low-arousal affective states such as sadness can 
influence risk preferences more than high-arousal states such as fear and joy. Having said 
that, it seems counterintuitive that low-arousal affective states that are supposed to lead to 
focused information processing, can significantly affect risk preferences whereas high arousal 
affective states that are assumed to inhibit information processing do not. Additionally, it may 
be promising to include a cognitive component of affect in future studies because joy, fear, 
and sadness may differ in the extent to which they are associated with certain appraisals 
(Lerner and Keltner, 2000; Lerner and Tiedens, 2006). Nevertheless, the differences in 
arousal levels are a possible explanation for why we find an influence of sadness on risk 
preferences, but not on fear and joy. 
Previous studies on the influence of affect on risk preferences have typically used a 
variety of affect induction procedures and measurements and have not varied or controlled for 
differences in valence or arousal levels. This may have introduced an unobservable bias 
across studies that contributed to the inconsistency of reported results. Therefore, we 
recommend for future studies that experimenters distinguish between the valence and arousal 
levels of affective states and, possibly, between the different appraisal components underlying 
distinct affective states. These distinctions will contribute to our understanding of and how 
specific affective states influence risk preferences or other decision outcomes. Understanding 
the definite influences of affective states will help individuals and organizations to improve 
the quality of their decisions. 
One of the possible reasons why our study does not find strong, consistent effects of 
moods at all levels of financial stakes may be the mood induction technique we chose. 
Although we used standard procedures from the psychological literature and our participants 
reported strong mood effects after induction (Cohen’s ds > 0.80, please see section 3.1), the 
resulting changes in moods may not have been intense enough to influence risk preferences 
consistently. This may have been particularly relevant for joy, although participants in the joy 
group stated the strongest induction effect (Cohen’s d = 1.56). Because individuals are 
typically in a positive resting mood (e.g., Clore and Huntsinger, 2007; Schwarz and Clore, 
1983), our mood induction may not have been strong enough to increase this positive resting 
mood to a sufficiently high level. Table 2 indicates that the mean difference between the 
participants in the control treatment without mood induction and the participants in the joy 
treatment is only ~ 0.2 (based on measures with a mean of zero and standard deviation of 
one). Thus, our film clip for inducing joy had only a slight effect on participants’ positive 
resting mood. By contrast, the participants who watched the sad film clip appear to have 
experienced a stronger difference from their default positive resting mood to the induced sad 
mood (mean difference ~ 0.7) than the differences that were observed for either the joy or fear 
treatments. This conscious deviation from the default mood may explain why we find that 
hypothetical and low-stakes decisions under risk are affected by sadness but not by joy. 
However, this argument cannot explain why we find no significant effects of fear on risk 
preferences (mean difference ~ 0.7). 
Despite our successful mood manipulations with film clips, vivid, recently experienced 
events in the real world, such as natural disasters (Cameron and Shah, 2012; Eckel et al., 
2009), terrorist attacks (Viscusi, 2009), traumas (Callen et al., 2011; Voors et al., 2012), the 
diagnose of a deadly disease (Sunstein 2003), or financial busts and bubbles (Cohn et al., 
2012; Guiso et al., 2013; Odeon et al., 2012) might have stronger, longer-lasting affective 
consequences that might influence risk preferences more profoundly even when the financial 
stakes are substantial. Moreover, affect that is directly caused by the decision situation (i.e., 
emotion) instead of being induced independently from the decision (i.e., mood) might also 
produce stronger effects (Davidson, 1994; Gray and Watson, 2001) on risk preferences. 
Nevertheless, recent laboratory experiments that used similar mood induction 
procedures to ours found significant effects of affect on ambiguity preferences (Baillon et al., 
2013), time preferences (Ifcher and Zarghamee, 2011), asset-pricing bubbles (Odeon et al., 
2012), and certainty equivalents (Guiso et al. 2013). Whereas the first three studies used 
incentive-compatible designs, the study by Guiso et al. (2013) investigated the relationship 
between fear and risk aversion with fixed financial incentives. Yet, these studies imply that 
short movie clips, such as those used in our study, can—in principle—change economic 
preferences and behavior. Furthermore, these studies suggest the possibility that affect is more 
relevant for other types of decisions than choices involving risk in the gain domain that we 
studied here. 
Although it may be possible that weak mood induction is the cause of our consistent 
null results for joy and fear, this reasoning cannot explain why the significant influence of 
sadness disappears when the study participants make decisions with serious financial stakes. 
The mood induction of sadness was equally successful for the fixed-financial-stakes treatment 
and the high-financial-stakes treatment (the means of the self-reported sadness scores are -
0.76 for the fixed-stakes treatment and -0.71 for the high-stakes treatment; pt-test = 0.97, N = 
162). Therefore, the observed differences in the effect of sadness on risk preferences in the 
nonexistent-, low- and high-stakes treatments are either caused by the different magnitudes of 
the financial stakes involved, the different payment procedures we used, or both. 
The main difference between the fixed- and the low-stakes treatment is, of course, that 
decisions were hypothetical in the fixed-stakes treatment, whereas they had small financial 
consequences in the low-stakes treatment. The difference between the low- and the high-
stakes treatment is, however, twofold. First, the expected payoff was 100/36 in the high-
stakes treatment, which is ~ 2.8 times higher than the low-stakes treatment by design. For 
most of our participants, the possible maximum payoff of 1,540 EUR in the high-stakes 
treatment was likely higher than their monthly income, whereas the maximum payoff of 
15.40EUR in the low-stakes treatment was roughly equal to the expected income for 1-2 
hours of paid work. Second, the slightly different payoff procedures may have also affected 
our results. In particular, the lottery for who would be paid the high-stakes conversion rate 
introduced another layer of uncertainty into this treatment. Furthermore, the expected delay in 
payments in the high-stakes treatment, although not explicitly stated in the experimental 
instructions, implies that participants may have discounted their expected payoffs. However, 
extreme ambiguity aversion and time-discounting factors would be required to offset the 
higher expected payoffs in the high-stakes treatment. Furthermore, the literature suggests that 
affective states have an influence on ambiguity (Baillon et al., 2013) and time preferences 
(Ifcher and Zarghamee, 2011). Thus, these differences in payoff procedures may have 
increased rather than decreased our chances of finding a significant effect of moods in the 
high-stakes treatment. 
We therefore argue that the different effects across the financial treatments are likely to 
be driven primarily by the presence and magnitude of financial stakes. Accordingly, our study 
corroborates methodological concerns that results from hypothetical or low-stakes decision 
experiments cannot be generalized to settings in which decisions have serious consequences 
(Smith, 2008; Harrison et al., 2009; Croson and Gneezy, 2009).  
5. Conclusion 
Despite our null results in the high-financial-stakes treatment, our findings do not allow 
us to reject existing models about affect or to claim that affect is generally irrelevant for 
decision making under conditions that involve risk. Instead, our main conclusions are of a 
methodological nature. First, we find different effects for two affective states of the same 
negative valence (i.e., fear and sadness) in the nonexistent- and low-financial-stakes 
treatment. This difference reinforces the need to study specific affective states of the same 
valence but with different arousal levels and possibly with the inclusion of appraisals. Thus, 
indirect evidence on the role of generally positive and negative affect that is caused by 
external circumstances and that can have a variety of affective consequences at the individual 
level, such as different weather conditions, may not be sufficient to unravel if and how affect 
influences decision making involving risk. 
Second, we conducted the first experiment on the role of distinct affective states on risk 
preferences in the financial domain that separately assessed decisions involving nonexistent, 
low, and high financial stakes. Our results imply that the influence of affect on risk 
preferences is sensitive to the magnitude of the financial consequences of the decisions. 
Because most of the studies on the role of affect on risk preferences are based on hypothetical 
or low-incentivized decisions, it is unclear how generalizable the (inconsistent) results of 
these studies may be to high-stakes decisions or to behavior in the field. Our findings 
emphasize the need for incentive-compatible experimental studies that fulfill the salience and 
dominance axioms (Smith, 1982). 
Eventually, our results provide a degree of confidence that the experimental research on 
financial decision making involving risk in the gain domain is unlikely to be directly 
confounded by the unobserved affective states of participants if the financial stakes in these 
experiments are sufficiently high. Our findings may also indicate that decisions involving risk 
in organizations may not be affected by individuals’ moods when the financial stakes are 
considerable. This insight can be valuable for designing decision processes and incentive 
schemes for individuals in organizations. 
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APPENDIX A. 
Experimental Instructions 
You will now receive detailed instructions regarding the course of the experiment. It is crucial 
for the success of our study that you fully understand the instructions. Please read the 
instructions carefully and do not hesitate to contact the experimenters in case you have any 
questions. 
The amount of money you can earn in this experiment is expressed in Experimental Dollars 
(ED). Irrespective of the results of the experiment, you will receive a participation fee of 9 
EUR Nevertheless, you should try throughout the experiment as hard as possible to achieve a 
good result and to make all your decisions as if you were playing for real money. 
Nonexistent financial stakes wording: 
The amount of money you can earn in this experiment is expressed in Experimental Dollars 
(ED). However, you will be paid out in cash in Euros. The conversion rate of ED to Euros is 
100:1. In other words, you will receive 0.01 EUR for every ED you earn during the 
experiment and you will be paid this amount in cash after the experiment. Thus, the best you 
can do throughout the experiment is to try as hard as possible to achieve a good result and 
keep in mind that you are playing for real money. 
Low financial stakes wording: 
The amount you can win in this experiment is expressed in Experimental Dollars (ED). These 
ED will be converted into Euros and paid out at the end of the experiment. The conversion 
rate from ED to Euros is determined in a lottery in which you participate. Today at 5pm at 
[address was handed out to the participants after the experiment] every one of the 36 
participants will draw a lot with a unique number on it. From these numbers, one winner will 
be randomly chosen by another lottery at 7pm at the same location. Attendance is not required 
for the lottery at 7pm. The lottery will be recorded on video and displayed on the Internet. 
The winner of the lottery will be notified immediately via email and telephone and the high 
conversion rate will be paid out to the winner. Independently of this procedure, every 
participant will be paid out with the normal conversion rate directly after this experiment. 
High financial stakes wording: 
The normal conversion rate of ED to Euros is 100:1. In other words, you will receive 0.01 
EUR for every ED you earn during the experiment and you will be paid this amount in cash 
after the experiment. However, the winner of the lottery will be paid with a conversion rate of 
1:1! In other words, the lottery winner will receive 100 times as much money for every ED he 
or she earned during the experiment. Your chances of being the winner are 1:36 or 2.8%. 
Because you could be the winner, the best you can do throughout the experiment is to try as 
hard as possible to achieve a good result and to make all your decisions as if you were playing 
for the high stakes of 1:1. 
 
[The following text is identical to the instructions in Holt and Laury (2002), see the following 
APPENDIX B.] 
APPENDIX B. 
Table B1 
Lottery choice task 
Below, you will be presented with 10 decision options that ask for your preference between 
two different gambles. One of the 10 decisions will be randomly determined at the end of the 
experiment and played out with real money. All 10 decision problems have the same 
probability of being drawn at the end.  
In all 10 gambles below, you will receive one payoff with a specific probability α or, 
alternatively, you will receive the other payoff with a complementary probability 1-α. Please 
indicate in the last two columns if you prefer option S or option R by making a cross in the 
respective column. The gamble is played by throwing a ten-sided dice. The number on the 
dice determines the row that describes the amount that will be paid to you. 
Options S Option R S R 
1/10 of ED 800, 9/10 of ED 640 1/10 of ED 1540, 9/10 of ED 40 O O 
2/10 of ED 800, 8/10 of ED 640 2/10 of ED 1540, 8/10 of ED 40 O O 
3/10 of ED 800, 7/10 of ED 640 3/10 of ED 1540, 7/10 of ED 40 O O 
4/10 of ED 800, 6/10 of ED 640 4/10 of ED 1540, 6/10 of ED 40 O O 
5/10 of ED 800, 5/10 of ED 640 5/10 of ED 1540, 5/10 of ED 40 O O 
6/10 of ED 800, 4/10 of ED 640 6/10 of ED 1540, 4/10 of ED 40 O O 
7/10 of ED 800, 3/10 of ED 640 7/10 of ED 1540, 3/10 of ED 40 O O 
8/10 of ED 800, 2/10 of ED 640 8/10 of ED 1540, 2/10 of ED 40 O O 
9/10 of ED 800, 1/10 of ED 640 9/10 of ED 1540, 1/10 of ED 40 O O 
10/10 of ED 800, 0/10 of ED 640 10/10 of ED 1540, 0/10 of ED 40 O O 
 
 
APPENDIX C. 
Table C1 
Correlations  
 
Risk_e Control Joy Fear Sadness 
 
Study1 
 
Female 
Control -0.09       
Joy -0.06 -0.32***      
Fear -0.02 -0.32*** -0.34***     
Sadness 0.17** -0.33*** -0.34*** -0.34***    
Study1 -0.09 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.02   
Female 0.04 0.03 0.02 -0.09 0.03 0.11**  
Age 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.01 -0.07 0.08 -0.10 
Extra. -0.02 -0.15** 0.17*** 0.00 -0.03 -0.05 0.09 
Conscient. -0.02 -0.03 0.09 0.04 -0.10 -0.01 0.29*** 
Emot.Stab. 0.05 0.02 -0.05 0.02 0.00 -0.15** -0.28*** 
Open. 0.12* 0.10 -0.03 -0.14** 0.08 -0.03 0.11* 
Fixedstakes -0.05 0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.21*** -0.10 
Lowstakes 0.08 -0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.16** 0.04 
Highstakes -0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.37*** 0.06 
Risk_sr 0.16** -0.03 -0.03 0.02 0.04 -0.04 -0.20*** 
 
Table C1 – continued 
Correlations  
 Age Extra. Conscient. Emot.Stab. Open. Fixedstakes Lowstakes Highstakes 
Extra. 0.04        
Conscient. 0.00 0.00       
Emot.Stab. -0.07 0.00 0.00      
Open. -0.08 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00     
Fixedstakes -0.09 -0.04 -0.07 -0.01 0.00    
Lowstakes -0.01 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.01 -0.52***   
Highstakes 0.10 0.00 0.03 -0.04 -0.01 -0.48*** -0.50***  
Risk_sr 0.03 0.29*** -0.04 0.19*** 0.24*** -0.04 0.08 -0.04 
Note: Pearson correlation coefficient, N = 223. 
Risk_e = Elicited risk preferences, Study 1 = Experimental study design 1, Extra. = Extraversion, Conscient. = Conscientiousness, 
Emot.Stab. = Emotional Stability, Open. = Openness, Risk_sr = Self-reported risk attitudes. 
The results are robust for using Kendall's Tau instead of the Pearson coefficient and for using a personality sum score instead of factor scores. 
* denotes > 90% confidence, ** denotes > 95% confidence, and *** denotes > 99% confidence. 
 
 
APPENDIX D. 
We calculated regressions using the model specifications in Table 3 and using only the 
incentive-compatible low- and high-financial-stakes observations from our sample in studies 
1 and 2 (N = 148). There are no significant main effects of moods on risk preferences. Model 
2 in Table D1 shows that joyful people are significantly more risk-seeking in the low-stakes 
treatment compared to the high-stakes treatment (β = -0.34, p = 0.05). 
Table D1 
OLS regressions on risk preferences with incentive-compatible observations. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 β p β p β p 
Intercept -0.06 0.93 -0.41 0.55 -0.28 0.69 
Joy 0.03 0.84 0.18 0.22 0.18 0.25 
Fear 0.10 0.42 0.13 0.38 0.09 0.59 
Sadness 0.20 0.13 0.17 0.28 0.16 0.34 
Low stakes 0.06 0.54 0.20 0.29 0.16 0.47 
Joy* Low stakes   -0.34* 0.05 -0.33 0.11 
Fear* Low stakes   -0.08 0.65 0.02 0.94 
Sadness* Low stakes   0.04 0.83 0.06 0.79 
Joy* Low stakes* Study 2     -0.001 0.99 
Fear* Low stakes* Study 2     -0.29 0.34 
Sadness* Low stakes* Study 2     -0.04 0.90 
Model diagnostics     
N 148 148 148 
R2 0.12 0.16 0.16 
Prob > F 0.22 0.14 0.22 
Note: βs are standardized for all variables except for the intercept. 
Control variables are the experimental study design, experimental study design* mood 
treatments, experimental study design* financial stakes, personality factor scores, and self-
reported risk attitudes. 
The reference groups are the control treatment, high financial stakes, and study 1. 
The results are robust for the exclusion of control variables, for including additional control 
variables (such as gender, age, and whether the movie was seen before), for including 
personality sum scores instead of factor scores, and for using OLogit instead of OLS. 
* denotes > 90% confidence, ** denotes > 95% confidence, and *** denotes > 99% 
confidence. 
In Table D2, we used the excluded observations from study 1 (N = 214) and calculated 
regressions with identical model specifications as Models 1 and 2 in Table 3. These 
observations were obtained from participants in study 1 who had completed one or two other 
tasks between the completion of their mood induction and their risk-preference assessment. 
Previous studies (e.g., Kim and Kanfer, 2009) have demonstrated that mood induction 
becomes weaker as the time period between the induction and task measurement becomes 
longer. It is therefore unsurprising that none of the mood treatments had a significant effect on 
risk preferences (ps > 0.1) in the data from these excluded observations. The results of Model 
2 in Table D2 corroborate the finding that the influence of moods is dependent on the 
magnitude of the financial stakes that are involved. In particular, Model 2 shows that people 
are generally more risk seeking in the low-stakes treatment than in the treatment with 
nonexistent financial stakes (β = -0.31, p = 0.05). Although not significant at conventional 
levels, Model 2 also indicates that sad people are more risk averse in the low-stakes treatment 
than in the control group (β = 0.25, p = 0.07). However, consistent with our main results, we 
find no evidence that the risk preferences of participants in the high-stakes treatment were 
influenced by their moods. 
Table D2 
OLS regressions on risk preferences with the observations excluded from study 1 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 β p β p 
Intercept 1.33 0.00 1.53 0.00 
Joy -0.01 0.80 -0.08 0.56 
Fear 0.07 0.47 -0.05 0.70 
Sadness 0.07 0.46 -0.06 0.68 
Low stakes -0.09 0.24 -0.31** 0.05 
High stakes 0.10 0.21 0.16 0.35 
Joy* Low stakes   0.12 0.38 
Joy* High stakes   -0.03 0.80 
Fear* Low stakes   0.17 0.22 
Fear* High stakes   0.03 0.83 
Sadness* Low stakes   0.25* 0.07 
Sadness* High stakes   -0.10 0.39 
N 188 188 
R2 0.04 0.08 
Prob > F 0.62 0.59 
Note: 26 out of 214 subjects are excluded because of unreasonable or inconsistent choices. 
βs are standardized for all variables except for the intercept. 
Control variables are the personality factor scores and self-reported risk attitudes. 
The reference groups are the control treatment and nonexistent financial stakes. 
The results are robust for the exclusion of control variables, for including additional control 
variables (such as gender, age, and whether the movie was seen before), for including 
personality sum scores instead of factor scores, and for using OLogit instead of OLS. 
* denotes > 90% confidence, ** denotes > 95% confidence, and *** denotes > 99% 
confidence. 
In Table D3, we used the pooled data from study 1 (N = 322) and conducted regression 
analyses with the model specifications for Models 1 and 2 in Table 3. We find no significant 
mood effects on risk preferences. In Model 1, participants in the high-stakes treatment are 
generally significantly more risk-averse (β = 0.16, p = 0.01) than in the fixed-financial-stakes 
treatment. 
Table D3 
OLS regressions on risk preferences with pooled observations from study 1. 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 β p β p 
Intercept 0.96 0.01 1.06 0.01 
Joy -0.01 0.93 0.01 0.90 
Fear 0.07 0.38 -0.01 0.95 
Sadness 0.10 0.19 0.03 0.81 
Low stakes 0.01 0.92 -0.08 0.54 
High stakes 0.16*** 0.01 0.18 0.17 
Joy* Low stakes   -0.02 0.86 
Joy* High stakes   -0.03 0.78 
Fear* Low stakes   0.09 0.45 
Fear* High stakes   0.06 0.50 
Sadness* Low stakes   0.15 0.19 
Sadness* High stakes   -0.07 0.49 
Model diagnostics 
N 278 278 
R2 0.04 0.06 
Prob > F 0.29 0.34 
Note: 44 out of 322 subjects are excluded because of unreasonable or inconsistent choices. 
βs are standardized for all variables except for the intercept. 
Control variables are the personality factor scores and self-reported risk attitudes. 
The reference groups are the control treatment and nonexistent financial stakes. 
The results are robust for the exclusion of control variables, for including additional control 
variables (such as gender, age, and whether the movie was seen before), for including 
personality sum scores instead of factor scores, and for using OLogit instead of OLS. 
* denotes > 90% confidence, ** denotes > 95% confidence, and *** denotes > 99% 
confidence. 
Table D4 shows the regression results by financial stakes when using the pooled data from 
study 1 (N = 322) and the identical model specifications as in Table 4. Model 2 in Table D4 
yields a significant effect of sadness (β = 0.23, p = 0.04) in the low-stakes treatment. Sad 
people are significantly more risk averse compared to people in the control treatment. 
Table D4 
OLS regressions on risk preferences by stakes with observations from study 1. 
 Model 1: 
Fixed stakes 
Model 2: 
Low stakes 
Model 3: 
High stakes 
 β p β p β p 
Intercept 0.74 0.12 1.06 0.05 1.67 0.11 
Joy 0.002 0.98 -0.03 0.82 -0.28 0.27 
Fear 0.02 0.86 0.10 0.37 0.26 0.29 
Sadness -0.02 0.89 0.23** 0.04 -0.22 0.37 
Model diagnostics    
N 122 123 33 
R2 0.02 0.08 0.24 
Prob > F 0.96 0.33 0.52 
Note: 44 out of 322 subjects are excluded because of unreasonable or inconsistent choices. 
βs are standardized for all variables except for the intercept. 
Control variables are the personality factor scores and self-reported risk attitudes. 
The reference group is the control treatment. 
The results are robust for the exclusion of control variables, for including additional control 
variables (such as gender, age, and whether the movie was seen before), for including 
personality sum scores instead of factor scores, and for using OLogit instead of OLS. 
* denotes > 90% confidence, ** denotes > 95% confidence, and *** denotes > 99% 
confidence. 
In Table D5, we used the pooled high-stakes observations from study 1 and from study 2 (N = 
92) for a regression analysis with the identical model specifications as in Model 1 in Table 3. 
We do not find significant effects of moods on risk preferences. 
Table D5 
OLS regressions on risk preferences with pooled high-stakes observations from studies 1 and 
2. 
 β p 
Intercept 0.50 0.48 
Joy 0.13 0.34 
Fear 0.12 0.37 
Sadness 0.07 0.62 
Model diagnostics 
N 92 
R2 0.04 
Prob > F 0.92 
Note: None of the subjects are excluded because of unreasonable or inconsistent choices. 
βs are standardized for all variables except for the intercept. 
Control variables are the personality factor scores and self-reported risk attitudes. 
The reference group is the control treatment. 
The results are robust for the exclusion of control variables, for including additional control 
variables (such as gender, age, and whether the movie was seen before), for including 
personality sum scores instead of factor scores, and for using OLogit instead of OLS. 
* denotes > 90% confidence, ** denotes > 95% confidence, and *** denotes > 99% 
confidence. 
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